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Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000
Rethinking Political Process in Technological Change:
Socio-technical Con gurations and Frames
IANMcLOUGHLIN, RICHARDBADHAM& PAUL COUCHMAN
ABSTRACT The political process perspective has done much to enhance our understanding of the
organizational e Ú ects of technological change as a negotiated outcome reecting the political and power
dynamics of the adopting context. In so doing, we suggest, technology has been marginalized as an
analytical category and the problem of change agency, although better understood, remains largely
unresolved. This article addresses these issues through the articulation of the concepts of socio-technical
congurations and technological frames and explores their utility in understanding change agency through
an action research project. The project sought a novel form of ‘socio-technology’ transfer, taking ideas
and concepts of ‘human-centered’ manufacturing embodied in team-based cellular manufacture from a
European context into three rms in Australia.
Introduction
It is now widely accepted by students of organization that the eÚ ects of new technologies
and production techniques are best understood, not in terms of the capabilities and
characteristics of the technology/techniques themselves, but rather as an outcome of
political processes concerning their selection, development, deployment and use.1 This
‘process perspective’ emphasizes an understanding of change within organizations in
terms of a political/cultural metaphor.2 It is concerned to explore not only the outcomes
of technological change but also the ‘power-processes’ within adopting organizations
through which they are produced.3 Whilst such a perspective has provided a considerable
enhancement of our understanding of the human and organizational dimensions of
technological change, in this article we argue that it also has limitations. We suggest that
these now need to be confronted if the bene ts of understanding the relationship between
technology and organization in this way are to be more fully exploited.
Accordingly we seek to add to the political process approach through the introduction
of the concept of socio-technical conguration.4 We seek to combine this with the idea
of ‘technological frames’ which has already gained some currency amongst organizational
researchers.5 Our purpose here is twofold. First, to provide greater analytical leverage in
showing how political processes shape both the technological as well as the human and
organizational dimensions of change. Second, to focus more directly on the role of change
agents in shaping both process and outcomes understood in this broader way.
To provide empirical illustration of our argument we will draw upon an action
Ian McLoughlin is Head of the Newcastle School of Management, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne,
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18 I. McLoughlin et al.
research study and associated case study analysis of the introduction of team-based
cellular manufacturing in three Australian organizations. This study is of particular
signicance, not least because it involved an intervention as action researchers in the
three rms by a team led by two of the authors (Badham and Couchman). This rather
unique experience of major change projects within companies from the inside provides a
very rich insight into the nature of the political processes and agency through which
technology and organization are shaped in context. We begin with a brief consideration
of the treatment of technology and change agency in the political process perspective.
We then consider the conceptual development identied above, and nally consider the
experience of action research in the three Australian rms.
Technology, Change Agency and Political Process
One image of organizations as political systems rests on the view that organization is
only made possible by the bringing together of ‘divergent interests’. Organizing therefore
involves ongoing processes of ‘wheeling and dealing’, negotiation, coalition building and
the exercise of mutual inuence as eÚ orts are made to resolve con ict arising from the
pursuit of diÚ erent interests.6 Such eÚ orts typically require the mobilization of power
resources through political activity. Organizations can thus be understood as ‘fundament-
ally political entities’.7 In now numerous studies of the introduction of new technologies
and production techniques this basic starting point has been used to develop an
understanding of the processes by which the organizational outcomes of technological
change are shaped. The aim is to reveal and explain the political nature of change by
examining in detail the actions and interpretations of those seeking to inuence its
outcomes, showing how the history of such decisions is socially constructed, and seeking
to deconstruct the ‘rationalizations presented to justify them’.8 Through such analysis the
introduction of new technology and associated ways of working is conceptualized as a
process during which critical junctures arise where decisions and choices are made and
negotiated by other stakeholder interests. It is this political activity that has the decisive
bearing on the actual outcomes of change rather than, for example, the characteristics
and capabilities of the technology concerned.
Critics have pointed to at least two signicant weaknesses with the political process
approach so conceived. First, technology is frequently viewed as of little analytical
importance. Talking of the ‘impact’ of technology on organizations makes little analytical
sense since it serves only to conceal the political process that lies behind its actual
organizational eÚ ects.9 This analytical position is bolstered by the view that decisions
concerning the design and shaping of new technologies are largely taken independent of
(in organizational, spatial and temporal senses) the adopting situation. By the time, in
the place and in the context in which the technology is adopted, key design questions are
in eÚ ect ‘frozen’ into the technology and at best become one contextual ‘reference point’
for choice and negotiation. Even though there have been attempts to explicate the nature
of this ‘reference point’ more clearly in relation to choices over the implementation and
use of technology,10 such ‘soft determinism’, critics argue, still misses the point.11 The
problem is rather more fundamental. That is, that in seeking to avoid the problems of
technological determinism, the political process approach has adhered to a view of
technology as a separate system from the social aspects of organization which has little
ultimate consequence for the organizational outcomes of change. The problem of
determinism is thus resolved in most instances by restricting the analytical signicance of
technology as an explanatory variable; in particular, in its deployment and use within
adopting organizations.12
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Rethinking Political Process 19
Asecond area of criticismconcerns the implications of the political process perspective
for change agency and change intervention. On the face of it, the perspective is at its
most insightful on this issue revealing both the nature of choice and the scope for choice-
making in relation to selection, development, deployment and use. However, the very
complexity of the analytical models constructed to reveal this appear to militate against
the practical realization of alternative modes of action.13 This complexity prevents, it
seems, detailed prescriptions that might improve managerial or other change agent’s
capacity to intervene in shaping the outcomes of change. Moreover, where prescription
is attempted, as for example by Dawson,14 it can appear remarkably similar to the
‘listology’15 and ‘mechanical manipulation’16 that the proponents of the political process
approach criticize other less theoretically well informed positions of themselves. As
Salzman notes, the conceptual frameworks erected by the political process perspectives
maps an organizational ‘landscape’ that seemingly, ‘dees prescriptive navigation’.17
In our eÚ ort to explore the navigation problems of the change agent in more depth
we wish in this article to adopt a diÚ erent stance to the analysis of technology. This is
derived from recent developments in the sociology of technology. Accordingly, our view
of technology is one that does not pre-dene the role and signicance of ‘the technical’
and views its production (selection and development) and consumption (deployment and
use) as part of an on-going political process. This process denes, within the adopting
context, the boundaries between the social and technical, identies the requirements and
capabilities of technology, and inuences the organizational eÚ ects that it has. As such,
technology can be seen as part of a broad ‘socio-technical ensemble’18 or ‘network’.19 In
this approach the political and social nature of technological change is revealed, not by
showing how limited technical capabilities and characteristics are as an explanation for
organizational change, but, rather, focusing on competing accounts (‘interpretive exibil-
ity’) of technology and its eÚ ects in contexts that shape these accounts and inuences the
outcomes of intertwined networks or ensembles of socio-technical change.
In taking this insight further, we wish to build on recent progress in the analysis of
change agents and change agency. This has sought to identify the political expertise
required by change agents in intervening and seeking to shape the outcomes of technology-
related and other organizational change. Buchanan and Boddy,20 for example, suggest
change agents need to develop a broader repertoire or ‘extended tool kit’ of capabilities
whilst Buchanan and Badham21 point to the need for ‘power-assisted’ steering for change
agents. Orlikowski and HoÚ man22 follow a similar line of argument by emphasizing the
need for change agency to be seen as ‘collective improvisation’ around a theme. Thinking
and acting in this way allows us more readily to recognize that technological change is
not an event that, once completed, will return the organization to an already known
state. Rather, the full extent and likely outcomes cannot be anticipated a priori. Change
involves ‘enacting an ongoing series of local innovations that embellish the original
structure, respond to spontaneous departures and unexpected opportunities, and iterate
and build on each other over time’.23
Suchobservations also point to the inter-relationshipbetweenour re-conceptualization
of technology and the role of change agency. Conventionally the political process
perspective would view the use of ‘extended toolkits’ and ‘collective improvisations’ as
useful ways of addressinghow issues concerning the use of technologymight be inuenced.
As noted above, viewing technology as a cultural product that is socially constructed in
the adopting context (i.e. not ‘frozen’ prior to its deployment and use) opens up the
conceptual space for technology itself to be understood as the consequence of political
action within the adopting context. In this view, the characteristics and capabilities of a
technology, what it can and cannot do, are not essentially technical matters resolved
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20 I. McLoughlin et al.
prior to and distant from the adopting context. They are, rather, seen as part of, not
separate from, the political process and open to contestation and disputation during and
beyond initial deployment and use. The landscape over which the change agent must
navigate at once becomes even more complex but at the same time pregnant with rather
more possibilities.
Socio-technical Con gurations and Frames
In this section we seek to build on the above insights by suggesting a conceptual
framework through which the role of change agents as shapers of both technology and
organization can be more readily understood. Our starting point is what we see as the
inherent ‘vulnerability’ of many contemporary change projects that seek to combine
‘technological’ and ‘organisational’ innovations.24 Such projects tend to cut across hori-
zontal and vertical boundaries within organizations and impinge upon the interests of a
broad range of ‘stakeholders’ who may perceive a variety of ‘threats’ and ‘opportunities’.
Moreover, both the technical and organizational dimensions of projects tend to be
characterized by high degrees of uncertainty concerning such issues as objectives, time
scales, potential problems and unintended consequences. Implementation is likely to
involve high levels of political negotiation, alliance building, conict resolution and
compromise of objectives where the outcomes of change are highly contingent upon
interventions made in organizational political and cultural systems.25 There are good
arguments to suggest that, as attempts are made to migrate from Fordist to ‘post-Fordist’
modes of organization, change in organizations in general is characterized by such
vulnerability.26
The vulnerable characteristics of many contemporary change projects draws attention
to the considerable amount of what we term local ‘congurational’ activity required in
order to adapt generic models of the optimum relationship between technological
and human/organizational resources to the particular production and organizational
environment of a specic enterprise.27 In such circumstances, the outcomes of change are
inuenced in crucial ways by how these aspects of the implementation process are dealt
with. The crucial features of both the social and technical outcomes of change can be
regarded as the result of incremental local/internal customization and adaptation of
generic systems and models albeit shaped and constrained by broader conditions and
inuences. These activities can be described as congurational processes carried out in the
context of existing congurations of technological, organizational and human resources
bounded by broader internal and external environmental contexts (see Figure 1). Con-
gurational processes have the eÚ ect of sustaining or transforming the manner in which
material resources are turned into outputs and in so doing the nature of existing
congurations of technological, organizational and human resources is either maintained
or changed.
Two points concerning this model need to be emphasized for the purpose of the
current discussion. First, technological congurations are the speci c constellation of
knowledge, equipment and procedures that make up the material, technical, non-human
elements of a production system. In contrast to the conventional political process view of
technology as having generic, xed characteristics, capabilities and requirements to make
it work, the concept of technological conguration points to the loosely systemic, complex
and locally constituted character of working technological systems.28 Specic generic
technological elements are, within this view, merely a resource that can only become a
working technology when they are appropriately congured within a production context.
This leads to a second point concerning the agency involved in such congurational
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Rethinking Political Process 21
processes. In this sense change agents and change interventionists can be viewed as
congurational intrapreneurs. That is, they constitute the agency throughwhich the production
and consumption of congurations takes-place. ‘Intrepreneurs’ (we use the term deliber-
ately very broady here) establish and operate new congurations, managing their
boundaries, as well as ensuring survival and guiding their development. This involves
interactions in both internal organizational relationships but also activity in other
organizations. Intrepreneurial activity is required to gain legitimacy for both technical
and social elements of congurations and is essential for the implementation of working
technical systems. The congurational activity of the intrepreneur therefore involves more
than sustaining or bringing about changes in the material and technological character of
the work environment. More fundamentally it involves the reproduction or challenging
of prevailing shared belief systems and technological practices within organizations.
The belief systems and practices through which a technology is given meaning and
obduracy have been termed ‘technological frames’.29 Although this idea has been
developed in social studies of technology, in particular, through the social construction of
technology (SCOT) approach,30 it has also been deployed recently in more mainstream
organization studies of technological change.31 For Orlikowski and Gash, frames refer to
the shared assumptions, knowledge and expectations about the purpose, context and
importance of a technology. These have a strong inuence over choices concerning the
design and use of technologies. Similarly, from the perspective of the sociology of
technology Bijker argues that frames, on the one hand, enable ‘thinking and action’ and,
on the other, by dening what constitutes a socio-technical problem and an acceptable
solution to it, act as a constraint. According to Bijker, the more developed a frame the
more such constraints are felt, the more closure in respect of openness to alternative
interpretations and arguments exists, the more as a belief system it is stabilized and, the
more ‘hard’ or ‘obdurate’ the technology and associated practices which the frame gives
rise to and supports appear.
According to Orlikowski and Gash,32 the degree of closure can be particularly
problematic during periods of change. It is during such periods that existing dominant
frames may be challenged by new technologies and associated new expectations con-
cerning their signicance, characteristics, capabilities and use. For example, di Ú erent
groups may interpret and ‘make sense’ of a new technology in di Ú erent ways thereby
leading to a high level of incongruence between the interpretative schemes of various
stakeholders. Thus the objectives and values of system designers that are embodied in
the technology may be at variance to those of diÚ erent groups of users such as line
management or employee groups. In addition, there will be a tendency on the part of
users to ‘make sense’ of a new technology through frames associated with existing ‘old’
technologies. In this sense existing frames may ‘inhibit learning’ when confronted by new
technological possibilities represented by alternative frames.33
One problematic aspect of the notion of technological frames arises in relation to the
degree and nature of closure and stabilization of belief systems. In part this, as Williams
and Russell note, betrays the origins of the concept in studies of the social construction
of scientic knowledge.34 Here the collegiate relations of the laboratory lent themselves
to a model where particular belief systems could become dominant modes of interpreta-
tion and denition through a process of consensus building. However, the extent to
which—what might be termed consensual closure—is ever possible in work organizations
is doubtful given the much broader range of social groups involved and the diverse prior
orientations and values which they bring to the employment situation. This of course
raises the question of in what sense, if any, closure is ever achieved in work organizations
to the extent that sociologists of technology such as Bijker seem to suggest is necessary
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22 I. McLoughlin et al.
for a technology to stabilize. Moreover, viewed in this way as a cultural product, it is
very hard for a politics/process perspective to sustain a position that views technology as
eÚ ectively ‘frozen’ prior to its implementation. Rather it is the political process of
implementation and even beyond which produces what is accepted in the local adopting
context to be a working technology.
Wisely, in their deployment of the notion of frames Orlikowski and Gash seek to take
account of this by referring instead to the degrees of ‘congruence’ that exist between the
frames of various stakeholder groups. Here ‘congruence’ is seen to indicate similar
rather than identical interpretations of technology and the context of its application.
Incongruence in frames thus points to ‘important di Ú erences in expectations, assumptions,
or knowledge about some key aspects of the technology’, whilst congruence refers to a
higher degree of interpretative alignment in relation to such issues. The degree of
incongruence between frames can thus be seen as a source of di Ý culties and con icts
over the development, implementation and use of a technology during its adoption.
Whilst not making this point themselves, it seems that what Orlikowski and Gash have
in mind are circumstances where closure is achieved—or at least attempted—in situations
that exhibit high levels of conict in relation to fundamental issues of use. That is
stabilization is possible even though con icting beliefs concerning a technology and its
use remain evident amongst, and quite possibly within, diÚ erent stakeholder groups.
Thus, whilst we will refer below to the notion of ‘dominant technological frames’, we are
conscious that even here we are talking of a highly contingent and not necessarily
consensual ensembles of beliefs and practices around a technology. ‘Dominance’ in what
follows should be taken to refer to a relative degree of congruence within a frame which,
in given circumstances, renders it more or less obdurate and diÝ cult to challenge from
alternative view points.35
With these points in mind, we would suggest that political processes can now be
understood as involving congurational activity focused on the material, technical,
systemic and structural features of a socio-technical systemand the interpretative schemes
through which these are givenmeaning and understood. Such an approach, furthermore,
goes some way in responding to the two weaknesses with the organizational politics/
process approach discussed above. First, the focus on the post-adoption conguration of
generic technologies and production techniques highlights the ‘interpretative  exibility’
of the denition, characteristics and capabilities of such systems. Rather than trying to
‘squeeze’ the ‘technical’ out of the analysis attention can be given to the way political
processes shape technology within the adopting context. At the same time, the concept
of technological frames emphasizes that this is as much an interpretative process as one
that concerns the conguration of material and technical resources. Second, the micro-
political aspects of change management and intervention are brought further to the fore.
In particular, the role of ‘congurational intrapreneurs’ in managing incongruence
between the frames of di Ú erent stakeholder groups, and in securing legitimacy for change
through attempts to challenge dominant knowledge, expectations and assumptions
concerning existing socio-technical congurations, becomes crucial.
Con guring TBCM in Three Australian Firms—the SMARTProject
We now attempt to illustrate the utility of this conceptualization of political processes by
considering the experience of ‘congurational intrapreneurs’ in an action research project
in three Australian companies.
The companies in which the action research and subsequent case studies were
undertaken were:
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Rethinking Political Process 23
· KangarooWhitegoods, part of an international domestic appliance company that manufac-
tured whitegoods and oor care products
· Wombat Plastics, a division of the Australian operation of an international motor
company, which supplied plastics components for local car assembly; and
· Koala Irrigation, a manufacturer of plastic irrigation systems.
Inevitably in a journal article we can only give a avour of the rich complexity that
constituted the change process in each case. We begin by outlining the SMART project
objectives and research methods/design.
Socio-technology Transfer Through Action Research
The SMART project was funded by the Australian Federal government with nancial
contributions also coming from three participating companies. The project’s origins lay
in an agreement reached in 1990 between the Australian and German governments to
establish a collaborative research and industry project in the area of manufacturing
software. This decision was followed in 1992 by a fact-nding mission to examine team-
based cellular manufacture in German rms by a team of researchers and industry
personnel. The members of the mission subsequently agreed to collaborate on an
Australian project that broadened the original focus beyond software systems to examine
‘smart manufacturing techniques’. Speci cally it was decided to focus on team-based
cellular manufacturing (TBCM), seen by many socio-technical theorists and practitioners
as a promising vehicle for getting more ‘human-centered’ design and participatory
principles onto the organizational agenda.36 Federal funding was won for a two year
programme which commenced in 1993. The main objectives of the SMART project
were to:
(a) Attempt a novel form of ‘technology transfer’ by seeking to apply Scandinavian and
particularly German concepts of ‘human-centred systemdesign’ in the rather di Ú erent
production culture and environment of Australian manufacturing;
(b) Learn from existing innovation in team-based manufacturing in Australian industry;
(c) Produce ‘deliverables’ which were to include software and organizational products
that could subsequently be used to support the development of TBCMelsewhere.37
The project brought together university organizational scientists and engineers
together with consultant researchers from Federal and State research organizations. This
team worked in various permutations with company personnel in the three ‘sub-project’
 rms. The action researchers, and company change agents who they were able to enroll
into the project, had—to varying degrees—assumptions, knowledge and expectations
concerning the conguration of production machinery and the organization of work and
employees around it which were at variance with conventional ‘Fordist’ practice in
Australian manufacturing.38 Their activity was usually focused in and around some
form of project design and/or implementation team consisting of relevant company
representatives with union and/or employee representation.
At Kangaroo this took the form of a project implementation team (PIT) consisting of
academic members of the SMART project team, company representatives from various
functions, representation from the press shop including the intended pilot cell team
leader. At Wombat this took the form of an instrument panel assembly design (IPAD)
teamwhich emerged out of an impromptu ‘brainstorming’ session at the plant. The team
was comprised of SMART project and company personnel as at Kangaroo. In both cases
the teams were formally meant to report to broader steering or stakeholder groups with
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24 I. McLoughlin et al.
higher level management and union representation although in both cases these forums
did not meet regularly as intended. At Koala change prior to the commencement of the
SMART project had been made with reference to a consultative committee with
management, union and elected employee representatives. Subsequently the cell teams
themselves, in informal dialogue with plant management and engineers, became the
main vehicle through which implementation was progressed. In all cases it should be
noted that the framework within which these arrangements operated was provided by
enterprise level agreements reached as part of the broader reform of the Australian
industrial relations system during the period.39
At the end of the project, a summative retrospective study was undertaken by one of
the authors (McLoughlin) to produce detailed case studies of the three action-research
projects.40 This involved lengthy interviews and discussion with academic and consultant
members of the action research team, analysis of project documentation (minutes of
meetings, quarterly project reports, working papers etc.); site visits to the three companies;
interviews with key company personnel involved in each sub-project; interviews and
informal discussionwith operatives in the cell teams; and interviewswithunion representa-
tives. This data was supplemented in late 1996 by a follow-up site visit to two of the
companies and interviews with company and other personnel involved in the original
project at the third. The account provided in this paper is therefore based primarily on
McLoughlin’s retrospective case study research. However, since the other two authors
were ‘there in situ’ as many of the events recounted took place, this article also bene ts
from the insights and corroboration of co-authors who in a signicant sense were also a
source of and indeed constitute part of ‘the data’. Subsequently, and unusually of course,
the two concerned were also part of the analytical sense-making involved in turning this
material into ‘academic knowledge’.41
At the commencement of the two-year action research phase of the change pro-
grammes, the three organizations had a varied experience of TBCM and related
manufacturing innovations. These ranged from an already established two year old
programme of cellular production and team-based working that had attracted Federal
government support under a programme designed to encourage and disseminate ‘best
practice’ (Koala); a history since the mid-1980s of experimenting with work teams,
participative management techniques and quality improvement programmes that had
won external recognition and awards (Wombat); and, since the late 1980s, small scale
experiments with quality management and just-in-time techniques with mixed success,
including shelved plans in the early 1990s to introduce cellular manufacture (Kangaroo).
These varying prior experiences inuenced the objectives of each of the sub-projects.
For example, at Kangaroo the existing plans to cellularize the press shop meant the
initial focus was on a job redesign exercise to spell out various options concerning the
re-organization of press shop operators into teams. At this point, equipment was still laid
out according to function and operator jobs were restricted to a narrow range of low
skill, routine and largely repetitive tasks. At Wombat, the introduction of a new car
model presented the opportunity to redesign the assembly of the instrument panel for
the vehicle. Accordingly a set of socio-technical evaluation criterion were developed
which were then used to assess alternative production system designs. Again, existing
assembly was undertaken through conventional machine-paced operations with a narrow
operator task range, short task cycle times and an assembly line tightly coupled to an
upstream JIT system.
Finally, at Koala, performance measures andbroader issues of management organiza-
tion were addressed. Unlike the other two cases, this was done in the context of an
existing programme for the development of team-based manufacture that as noted above
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Rethinking Political Process 25
had already attracted external funding. This had facilitated a programme involving the
replacement of conventional ‘Taylorist’ assembly lines with seven manufacturing cells
and a programme of training for semi-autonomous team-working for some of the
workforce.
Consistent with the expectations of a political process perspective the ultimate fate of
each project showed considerable variation from what was intended as the political
processes and dynamics of the change process started to shape both process and outcomes.
For example, by the end of the project at Kangaroo only one, rather than the envisaged
ve, cells had been implemented; the training of the initial cell team members was only
completed after a considerable delay (this followed the arrival of an initially skeptical
new manufacturing manager); and a number of critical industrial relations issues con-
cerning the classication of cell teammembers and the team leader remained unresolved.
Moreover, doubts about the continuation of team-based cells beyond the life of the
project were raised by the impending takeover of the factory by another company. At
Wombat, the proposals for introducing TBCM were abandoned amidst much political
activity which resulted in the action researchers being marginalized (see below). At Koala
the contributions of the action researchers became submerged in a broader set of
dynamics which stalled and becalmed the overall change programme for a signicant
period. The upshot was that, even after some seven years of attempted change, only
three of the seven cell teams could still be said to be self-managing and functioning
autonomously and many unresolved and hitherto unforeseen problems remained.
The experience gained by the action researchers served to emphasize that, to a
signicant degree, success/failure to meet socio-technical objectives rested decisively in
each case with their capacity and their allies in the company to engage as ‘congurational
intrapreneurs’. This was necessary to eÚ ectively manage the micro political and cultural
dimensions of their roles within the more structural constraints that they faced in each
context. It was through such activity that they were able—or not—as the case may be,
to challenge dominant technological frames and seek to gain support for the alternative
beliefs, knowledge and expectations which underpinned TBCM as opposed to more
conventional Taylorist/Fordist approaches. We can explore this proposition in more
detail by looking at each sub-project case in turn.
Kangaroo Whitegoods
At rst blush, Kangaroo appeared the least promising of the three company’s sites for the
implementation of TBCM. There had been a chequered recent history of manufacturing
innovation at the plant, industrial relations were problematic and the factory had no
history of major investments in the training of shop-oor staÚ . There was a multi-cultural
workforce, many possessed low levels of English literacy, although some had high level
qualications from their native countries. At the same time, manufacturing engineers,
although receptive to new ideas, were resistant to outside inuence. Doubts also existed
as to the extent of senior management commitment to radical changes in working
methods. However, even though limited, the outcomes achieved by the end of the project
owed a considerable amount to the capacity of the action researchers and company
change agents to secure legitimacy for the project in what were at the outset hostile
circumstances. For instance, union support was secured in part through a prescient
intervention by one of the company project champions, prior to the oÝ cial start of the
project, during the negotiation of a new enterprise agreement. This resulted in enabling
clauses being inserted, which permitted a relaxation of job demarcations to allow team-
based working.
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26 I. McLoughlin et al.
Subsequently, considerable eÚ ort on the part of the action researchers was put into
calming the fears and gaining the support of the multi-cultural press shop workforce. As
the press shop supervisor recalled:
Anything they wanted to discuss we talked about . . . we talked about what we
perceived for cell 1 and what we anticipated doing in the training and how we then
wanted to branch it oÚ into the rest of the shop. And that’s when we started to hear
about what their concerns were. They didn’t have too many concerns except for
‘was anyone going to loose their job?’ or ‘are the setters going to loose their job?’.
The old way was to have people employed just to set a machine. When that
machine’s set the setter stands around with his nger up his arse. We said they’re
not going to loose their job they’ll be doing a few more functions. (Press shop
supervisor interviewed by McLoughlin)
Later in the project eÚ orts made by the action researchers in enrolling the new
manufacturing manager’s support was critical, as was the belated ‘conversion’ of the
press shop supervisor to the idea of TBCM. In the former instance, for example, an
apparent lack of commitment of the new manufacturing manager was a cause of
considerable uncertainty to members of the project team (one of his rst acts was to
move the highly supportive head—see below—of the implementation team to another
activity). As one subsequently commented:
. . . uncertain wasn’t the word for it. We were extremely worried until BM [new
Manufacturing Manager] bought the project. Until that point we were not sure
where we were going or what was happening. We kept on ploughing on. (Company
member of PIT interviewed by McLoughlin)
However, the eÚ orts of the action researchers to ‘win over’ the new manager proved
eÚ ective. On one occasion, this involved inviting the manager concerned to speak along
with international experts at a University seminar on cellular manufacturing. To the
surprise of the action researchers he referred to ‘his’ project at Kangaroo Whitegoods.
This was seen to signify his ‘buy in’ to the programme. Subsequently, the manager took
a masters degree at the University and produced a dissertation on the change at the
company.42
Having said this, the change programme was considerably delayed at this point by a
refusal to grant funding for the training programme:
What I got concerned with is that, there was a lot politics over training. I don’t
think people had their money organised for the training. We were stuÚ ed around to
a fair degree on the training. They put it oÚ because the eÝ ciency of the Press Shop
was down. ‘You can’t have training and keep the eÝ ciency up.’ Well it took us six
months to get the go ahead from when we put the  rst proposal which was ‘too
bloody expensive’. (Company member of PIT interviewed by McLoughlin)
In retrospect, there was no consensus on the role of the new manufacturing manager at
this time. For some, it was a reection of the ambivalence of his ‘buy in’ whilst others
alluded to his support for the project being constrained by the views of more senior
management. These reservations notwithstanding, the follow-up visit in late 1996 revealed
the success of these and other eÚ orts. Contrary to expectation, the TBCM programme
had been sustained, although its objectives were now more limited and several problems
still remained. Fears following the company take-over had proved unfounded, a new
senior management team was supportive, and the originally hostile press shop supervisor
had emerged as full ‘owner’ of the concept of team-based working in the shop.
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Rethinking Political Process 27
Wombat Plastics
In contrast, the Wombat project appeared to be set in much more fertile ground.
However, in this case there was a failure to establish support for the legitimacy of the
proposed changes by the action researchers and their company allies. In fact, as the
project began the extent of teamworking and other earlier manufacturing innovations at
the plant turned out to be more rhetoric than reality. In addition, the impetus of support
for the project from the plant’s senior management was lost at an early stage as key
supporters of the project left the company. For example, the plant manager who had
championed the project retired on health grounds before the project commenced and
subsequently an entrepreneurial new business manager who was a strong supporter also
left the plant. EÚ orts by the action researchers to enroll the support of a new plant
manager, a technically orientated individual with amore mechanistic view of production,
inevitably proved di Ý cult and ultimately unsuccessful. In consequence, as the project got
underway, there was:
· An absence of clear cut directives from senior level to the engineering management as
to the importance of the action researcher’s role or brief;
· The legitimation oÚ ered by the support of two key managers had been eroded; and
· The initial judgement that the plant already constituted a supportive context for shop-
oor innovation had been proved inaccurate.
The consequences of this quickly became apparent.
For example, we have already noted how the IPAD team was formed out of an
impromptu plant meeting. In fact, attendance of academic teammembers of the SMART
had been unplanned and their subsequent involvement in 14 meetings over a four month
period was undertaken without formal sanction. In its initial meetings the design team
envisaged it would proceed in two phases: the rst, to reach an agreement on and achieve
management/union endorsement of the criterion for redesign; the second, to commence
an iterative design process using di Ú erent types of simulation including computer
packages, ‘design by doing’ usingmock-ups, and actual assembly prototypes to test–‘hands
on’–diÚ erent assembly options. In fact, after a period of intensive activity, achievements
weremore modest, with agreement reached over a vision statement, the ranking of design
objectives and the need to de-couple the new process from the pull of the upstream JIT
system (this would permit the cell teammembers to hold unscheduled meetings up to 30
minutes in length). However, only limited detailed design work was possible beyond this
save for the identication of 11 diÚ erent assembly concepts. In the view of the action
researchers, only three of these were broadly consistent with team-based working and the
principal of adopting a cellular layout for the new assembly process was never established
within the team.
With the deadlines for the introduction of facilities to begin production of the new
panel looming, and the absence of any agreed and acceptable assembly system proposal
from the design team, the plant Engineering Manager unexpectedly announced his own
‘nal solution’. This had apparently been developed by a team of company engineers
working in parallel to the design team but without the knowledge of even the company
personnel on the IPAD team. Although it featured de-coupled cells by splitting the
assembly at diÚ erent stages and providing intermediate buÚ ers, the new design was still
essentially a paced assembly line. This solution was presented as a fait accompli to the
SMART researchers and their collaborators on the IPAD team. Whilst the retrospective
view of one of the SMART consultant researchers who worked in the plant for much of
this period was that the new design reected the inuence, if not active involvement, of
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28 I. McLoughlin et al.
the SMART researchers, a new implementation team was established which did not
include either the researchers or shop oor or union representation on the original team.
One nal twist occurred when the problems of physical space also proved an
insurmountable constraint for this unilateral and imposed ‘nal solution’. Its implementa-
tion assumed additional space becoming available which would permit the move of
another production line adjacent to the instrument panel assembly area. When this failed
to take place the new plant manager decided to put the movement of this line on
indenite hold. At this point the new implementation team were obliged to change their
plans and opt for the ‘fall back’ option of only a slight modication of the existing
assembly line to produce the new panel. This at least had the virtue of being consistent
with the plant’s budget for introducing the new model. From this point on, despite
symbolic involvement in one or two minor productivity improvement projects, the
SMART team were eÚ ectively ‘frozen out’ of the plant. Ironically, the company was to
use the cell concept—without the involvement of the action researchers—in the assembly
process for the instrument panels of ‘carry over’ models—a suggestion made previously
by the SMART researchers but not taken-up at the time.
Koala Irrigation
The lengthy prior experience of implementing TBCM at Koala also suggested a
relatively fertile environment within which to extend and develop ‘human-centered’
design principles. This was certainly evident in the critical views of production at the
plant prior to the cellurization programme aired by current management. It was also
evident in the highly favourable views of the contrast between working on the line and
in the cell expressed by the women on the shop oor.
It was absolutely autocratic. There was no participative management at all. They
had rigged up a system where they would press a button and a red light would
come on and more parts were sent for. The storeman would go and get the parts
and they [the assembly operators] would sit and wait. . . . If they wanted to go to
the toilet they had to ask the leading hand to leave their station. . . . (Cell team
coach, interviewed by McLoughlin)
We used to be regarded as housewives who came here for pin money. We were
never taken seriously and no one listened to our ideas. So we stopped giving them.
Since we went into cellular manufacturing we are listened to. It’s a really good
feeling. (Cell teammember interviewed by McLoughlin)
Indeed, the general shop-oor viewpoint of the contrasting experience was summarized
in a frequently repeated phrase which described work on the old assembly lines: ‘you
came to work, left your brains at the door’.
The change programmeatKoala had been initiatedby abroad-based teamembracing
both key managers at head oÝ ce, and di Ú erent levels of management within the plant.
It had begun in the context of a corporate ‘turn round’ strategy. This had been developed
to combat acute problems being faced by the company as a whole, and in a context
where the future of manufacturing was being questioned at headquarters in the face of
the increasing possibilities for buying-in cheap imports and marketing these under the
rm’s brand name. This coalition of headquarters and plant management managed,
nevertheless to initiate an impressive programme of innovation and change. The pro-
gramme grew to include, for instance, not only the layout of the entire assembly area
into seven cells and introduction of three cell teams, but also a signicant investment in
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Rethinking Political Process 29
new training facilities and staÚ training (aided by the ‘Best Practice’ programme—see
above), a re-orientation of human resource policy and practices around ‘high trust’
principles (e.g. the practice of ‘clocking-in’ and random searching of employees at quit
times were scrapped, whilst matters such as child care and equal opportunities policies
were given more signicance); and a move towards a ‘cluster’ organization structure
where managers would be designated and act as ‘coaches’ to cell teams.
However, key members of the coalition promoting this programme began to move to
other postings inside and beyond the company—not least because of the success of their
eÚ orts at the plant. In addition, newmarket conditions, alterations in head oÝ ce product
strategy, and other corporate changes (the latter culminating with the prospective sale of
the company), also occurred. As a result, the pace of change slowed, became deected
from its intended course and, for a while, stalled completely. At one point, a marketing
decision to stop production of a particular product led to redundancies in one of the
cells, whilst at another point, a short-lived new plant manager sought to re-introduce rst
line supervisors. It became increasingly evident to supporters of continuing change within
the plant that, given such dynamic and turbulent conditions, too much change was being
attempted on too many fronts. Moreover, ultimately corporate constraints were limiting
what could be achieved, placing limits, for example, on the engineering resources that
could be made available to progress the change programme, and insisting on a set of
performance measures which did not reveal the bene ts of TBCM.
. . . we’ve made huge changes here and improvements in productivity and yet nance
people will say, ‘well look you guys you lost half a million dollars in your recoveries
from your direct labour last year’ and that’s what they look at so you’re not doing
too well. So all the other changes we’ve made, like we’ve taken out 37 indirects and
taken four million dollars of WIP out and out quality has gone up and our delivery
times are better. All these things need to be included in our productivity. (Plant
engineer interviewed by McLoughlin)
. . . we got to the stage where further improvements at the plant required changes at
head oÝ ce as well . . . but . . . they only wanted it to happen at the plant as long as
it didn’t eÚ ect them. (Cell team coach interviewed by McLoughlin)
As noted above, the contributions of the SMART project action researchers were
submerged within this complex set of dynamics between the change process at the plant
and broader corporate and market developments. However, that the change programme
was revived and subsequently sustained despite these setbacks was largely due to the
creative vision and innovative eÚ orts of two company engineers who for key phases of
the change programme acted as ‘special projects’ managers. One of these engineers
eventually became plant manager as the period of involvement of the SMART project
team drew to a close. Both were highly committed to the concept of TBCM. They had
both been present at the plant throughout, lived locally rather than in the city, and had
the trust of shop-oor staÚ . It was they who were instrumental in promoting team-based
working as an alternative to conventional ‘Taylorist’ manufacturing methods both at the
plant and to corporate headquarters. One manifestation of their commitment was the
display throughout the factory of the ‘principles of socio-technical design’ (Mumford44).
Another, was their continuing and ongoing drive to persuade shop-oor personnel to
become involved in and make decisions that eÚ ected them. This embraced not only day-
to-day work operations within the cells, but also the design and improvement of the
layout of the cells, the development of performance measures and, as reported during
the follow-up visit, the involvement of cell teammembers in new product development.
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30 I. McLoughlin et al.
Viewing Political Processes in Terms of Con gurations and Frames
The concepts of congurational processes and technological frames can be used to
explore the problems faced by the action researchers and their company change
agent allies in more analytical depth. In each case we can say that ‘congurational
intrapreneurs’—action researchers and their company change agent allies—found their
capacity to translate the generic ideas of ‘cellular manufacture’ and ‘team-based working’
into potentially working socio-technical systems, in the adopting context of the plants
concerned, limited by local circumstance and contextual conditions. At the same time,
broader events at the level of the enterprise and beyond provided a shifting pattern of
inuence, which could and did impinge upon local activity. The latter was exempli ed
most obviously in the case of Kangaroo Whitegoods in the case of broader changes in
the industrial relations system making the conclusion of a new enterprise agreement of
particular strategic signicance for the proposed introduction of cells and teams into the
press shop. In all three cases, managerial and other upheavals linked to corporate
and ownership changes were signicant sources of uncertainty throughout. Whilst the
congurational process model does not solve the problem of prescriptive navigation in
these respects it does, we would argue, go some way to help chart and plot the nature of
the political process and factors inuencing its course in the three sub-project cases.
In particular, by focusing on the activity of a generic category of actors—‘congura-
tional intrapreneurs’—more salience is given to the micro-political activities of change
agents in shaping—albeit within constraints—socio-technical congurations. For example,
in each case a key element of the problem confronted by the change agents was in
challenging the obduracy of the existing knowledge, beliefs and expectations embodied
in the dominant technological frame which underpinned the conguration of technical
and human elements in the manufacturing system. As a result there were major problems
in achieving a degree of congruence between these existing frames of key stakeholder
groups and the rather di Ú erent ways of articulating problems and solutions proposed by
the action researchers and their allies to questions of how to best organize production.
Existing understandings of the eÚ ectiveness and eÝ ciency of production technologies and
systems were diÝ cult to supplant with new ones and the potential and eÚ ectiveness of
TBCM was frequently evaluated from within the connes of the existing dominant
technological frame. Prevailing socio-technical congurations thereby remained more or
less obdurate or ‘hard’ in terms of the interpretations of diÚ erent stakeholder groups and
diÝ cult to question or challenge by those who sought to articulate a di Ú erent set of
expectations, beliefs and knowledge. Again we can examine these propositions in more
detail by looking at each sub-project case in turn.
Kangaroo Whitegoods
At Kangaroo the dominant technological frame (whose essential elements were summar-
ized concisely by one company engineer as ‘cost reduction, overhead recovery, great pay
back, no investment and fuck all training’!) also resulted in an existing conguration of
machinery and work based on conventional functional layout and job design criterion.
The signicance of this output driven/cost reduction approach to the technical and social
organization of work was evidenced in a number of ways. During initial deliberations of
the project implementation team it became evident that company engineers were reluctant
to permit technical issues to be considered by the project implementation team and
instead preferred to resolve these outside of its deliberations.45
It is also noteworthy in this regard how important the actual physical relocation of
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Rethinking Political Process 31
the presses into their cell congurations was viewed by all associated with project. This
task was seen by plant management as particularly complex and one that could only be
accomplished during a plant shut down because of the perceived cost in terms of eÚ ect
on output. At the same time the movement of these large machines had a once and for
all character about it. Once congured into cellular layout they represented an image
that change was now going to happen, there was no way back, and from this point it
was evident that ‘the company’ was serious.
However, compared to Wombat (see below), the closure and stabilization of this
frame was, from the point of view of the action researchers at least, less complete and
more open to challenge from alternative problem denition/resolution arguments which
addressed the ‘non-technical’ issues of how to motivate and organize human operators.
In contrast again to Wombat, previous experiments with alternative manufacturing
methods and techniques appeared to have become more embedded in at least some
manufacturingmanagers and engineers perspectives. Under an innovative manufacturing
director, the company had experimented with ‘lean production’ concepts such as just-in-
time and operator responsibility for quality and one junior engineer in particular who
had been involved in these initiatives was particularly receptive to ‘human-centred’
conceptualizations of team-basedworkingderived fromcontinental Europe. Subsequently,
as noted above, the micro-political activities of the junior engineer became highly
signicant in inuencing negotiations of a new enterprise agreement in order that it
included enabling clauses which allowed the development of team-based working. When
the implementation team was formed this individual was chosen to head it up.
Having said this, this openness did not extend to the beliefs and expectations of all
company members of the project implementation team. These team members were
prepared to go beyond an ‘as is’ option which would restrict cell operators to mainly in-
cell material handling tasks with some responsibility for quality—leaving a cell team
leader with responsibilities for set-up, scheduling, maintenance, quality control, and the
like. However, they could not support, except as a long term objective, a ‘major change’
option which would involve a signi cant enlargement and enrichment of operator jobs,
giving them total responsibility for material management and set-up and a major role in
quality control and a signicant input into scheduling, equipment purchase, personnel
matters, and maintenance with attendant consequences for the role of supervisors in the
shop. Instead, they preferred a ‘minor change’ option mainly involving a broadening of
cell operators task range to encompass material management into the cell and some
maintenance responsibility. Similarly, in implementing even the ‘minor change’ option
‘technical arguments’ were frequently presented—especially by the press shop super-
visor—which in the view of the action researchers had the eÚ ect of watering down even
these modes of job redesign objectives.
It is interesting to reect on why the resultant outcomes in this case ultimately were
so modest from the human-centred perspective of the action researchers. One argument
could be that this reects the inevitable conservatism in innovation that occurs as interests
are amalgamated in order to mobilize some consensus over the content of change in a
socio-technical project.46 In other words, to achieve the degree of congruence between the
frames of stakeholder groups required in order to give suÝ cient legitimacy to the proposed
change, it was necessary to establish a particular contextually bound understanding of
what team-based cellular manufacture ought to and could be in the specic company
context. Aspects of this compromise, and evidence perhaps of its fragility, are provided in
the following comments of two company members of the implementation team.
It has gone a long way from what they were doing. . . . What they were doing was
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32 I. McLoughlin et al.
just a mundane job operating presses. That was virtually their whole function.
During this period of time there have been a few other structural changes in the
plant that have made a diÚ erence. We have got rid of our roving examiners or
inspectors on the shop oor and now with ‘quality at source’ you make your part
and check your part . . . so it hasn’t just been focused on team based it has been
focus on other aspects of manufacturing that are coming together in the cell
programme. (Company member of PIT interviewed by McLoughlin)
Maybe other people perceive it as far more successful than I do but, again, when
somebody puts on my desk the gures and proves to me that it was a raging
success—‘look howmuch we’ve reduced set-up times by, look howmuch our quality
has improved by’, then I’ll say, ‘yep, I’m wrong’. Haven’t seen them facts yet. I
reckon I’m right! (Former company head of PIT interviewed by McLoughlin)
Wombat Plastics
In the case of Wombat, the dominant frame was strongly inuenced by industrial
engineering and Taylorist/Fordist beliefs about the ‘best way’ to organize production. At
the same time, the particular ‘design space’,47 provided by the introduction of a new
model to re-design the way instrument panels were assembled, turned out to be extremely
constrained by this paradigm. First, the timetable governing the new model launch was
sacrosanct and increasingly became the most signicant ‘driver’ of plant management
thinking; second, the design of the instrument panel itself was already determined and
had taken no account of any possible alternative approaches to assembly—this meant,
for instance, that the panel had to be assembled by whatever means in 15 minutes
(compared to 35 minutes for the outgoing model’s panel); third, a just-in-time delivery
system dictated by the parent plant assembly line could be not be altered; the only
resources available for the redesign of the instrument panel assembly line (including
physical space essential to trial cellular assembly lay outs and to provide space for ‘buÚ er
stocks’ to isolate cells from the ‘pull’ of the just-in-time system) were those which could
be diverted fromother areas of the plant—there were no additional resources committed;
and nally there were requirements to integrate any new assembly process with the
requirement to continue assembly of the old panel for ‘carry over’ variants of the old car
model (mainly a commercial variant and a long wheel base model whose scheduled
replacements were due later). Without altering these seemingly xed and obdurate
parameters it seemed, contrary to initial expectation, that the scope for signicant ‘socio-
technology’ transfer in Wombat’s case would be highly limited.
Indeed, senior engineering and plant personnel were only prepared to accept as legit-
imate a viewof the problemof instrument panel assembly that prioritized issues of ensuring
continuity of production, product quality and did not threaten the schedule for the new
model’s introduction. By the same token, they were far more likely to be persuaded by
proposed design of assembly process solutions which rested on tight labour control and
machine-pacing and gave only minimal discretion to operators. The experience of the
IPAD team outlined above is consistent with this observation where even the basic prin-
ciple of an objective to move to cellular layout for the new assembly process could not be
established. Indeed, ‘technical’ victories for members of the SMART team were limited
to giving company engineers a greater appreciation of cellular techniques but this fell far
short of acceptance of their ‘technical’ advantage. In one exercise, for example, an engin-
eering member of the SMART team demonstrated through a computer simulation study
that a cellular layout had distinct advantages over a conventional assembly line when it
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Rethinking Political Process 33
came to ‘recovering’ production after an unscheduled stoppage. However, since these
advantages lay in providing more varied and exible work tasks for human operators they
did not constitute persuasive criterion for most company members of the IPAD team.
Fromtheir viewpoint, the same recovery performance couldbe achievedona conventional
line simply by further reducing task-cycle times and thereby boosting operator output.
Cellular layout, therefore, oÚ ered no ‘technical’ advantage.
The arguments of the action researchers that the goals of continuity of production
and product quality were better served by also prioritizing worker discretion and
autonomy proved, therefore, extremely diÝ cult to advance. From the perspective of
company engineers on the IPAD team alternative design concepts that embraced human
and organizational factors were perceived as either intangible, unworkable, or as having
bene ts which were far outweighed by their costs. The human and organizational eÚ ects
of machine paced working, and the counter view that in reality new environmental
uncertainties were faced which generated requirements for informed intervention by
human operatives, were easily ignored or downplayed. As a result, alternative design
options, such as de-coupled work stations and buÚ ers, the enlargement of jobs to
encompass ‘whole tasks’, and the need for planned stoppages of production to enable
work teams to discuss and resolve production problems, were regarded as ‘mis ts’ that
would produce sub-optimum outcomes in terms of productive continuity and eÝ ciency.
It can be suggested here that it was through such arguments that the exemplary status of
Fordist design principles could be seen as being maintained along with the apparent
obduracy of Fordist production line technology and work design. Indeed, the high degree
of micro-political activity on the part of company opponents already noted in this case
is testament to the degree of incongruence between the assumptions, knowledge and
expectations of the dominant company stakeholders and those of the action researchers.
Koala Irrigation
At Koala, a rather di Ú erent case of change being dominated by one technological frame
was experienced. Here, as was indicated above, socio-technical principles were already
strongly embedded and articulated in the belief system of key actors in the factory. Whilst
the action researchers might thus be seen as ‘pushing on an open door’ they, in fact,
experienced considerable diÝ culty in having their role accepted by both management
and employees at the plant, or seen as of great signicance in the changes that occurred.
One possible way of understanding this is to say that key factory personnel already had
a high level of inclusion in the human-centred frame as congured at the plant. On the one
hand, this meant their thoughts and actions were constrained by relatively unambiguous
understandings of what socio-technical principles and TBCM were. On the other hand,
there were many uncertainties at the level of detail as to how these principles could be
implemented, operated and developed over time (a case of the more that was known the
less it was realized was known). For example, the special projects engineer who eventually
became plant manager reected as follows:
I don’t really see our progression after four years as anywhere near where we need
to go or where we want to be at this particular time. I think we’ve only achieved 20
to 30% of what we need to achieve if that. But if you start talking to people in the
business and you look around then we have come a long way. (Interviewed by
McLoughlin)
The action researchers, on the other hand, had a relatively low inclusion in the dominant
frame at the plant even though they were well versed in the generic models of socio-
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34 I. McLoughlin et al.
technical system design and TBCM. Paradoxically, TBCM at the plant had achieved an
obduracy andhardness thatmade attempts to render it malleable by the action researchers
sometimes appear naõ¨ ve and politically inept in the eyes of key plant personnel. For
example, there was an early attempt by a junior member of the SMART team to
‘deconstruct’ the change process up to that point through a politically radical analysis of
workplace reform at the plant. This sought to examine the introduction of teams as a
more insidious form of management control and the report produced caused some
diÝ culties with the then plant management. Subsequently, the activities of the SMART
team had a more (technical) focus, but even here, their practical consequences were not
always apparent, in particular, to the cell teammembers:
He [SMART team member]  lled our heads with all these dreams and not one of
them turned out. We were quite disappointed. (Cell team member interviewed by
McLoughlin)
The general view reported by factory personnel after the project had nished was that
the action researchers had learnt far more from them than plant personnel ever did from
the supposed external ‘experts’.
Conclusion
The political process perspective highlights the signicance of intervention in the political
and cultural systems of organizations to accomplish change. However, the perspective
has tended to focus the need for such intervention on the way technology is used rather
than on the shaping of technology itself within adopting contexts. At the same time
analytical models and prescriptive guidance to change agents and interventionists is
limited and often seems, in the face of the complexity of the change process, too simplistic.
In this article, we have considered the experiences of an action research project where
two of the authors were directly engaged in seeking to manage the political, symbolic
and substantive dimensions of a change project.
As we have outlined there were considerable problems in creating the necessary
legitimacy for a shift to/development of TBCM in the three organizations. This can be
understood, it is suggested, in terms of the incongruence between the dominant assump-
tions, knowledge and expectations concerning the conguration of the technical and
human elements of production held within the rms and those proposed by the socio-
technical values and beliefs expressed in the frames of the action researchers and their
allies. Indeed, if ‘frames’ can create ‘psychic prisons’ for those who articulate them,48
then signicant aspects of change agency in the cases outlined here can be characterized
in terms of the diÝ culty of bringing about ‘cognitive jail breaking’ (i.e. to challenge and
encourage key stakeholders to ‘break out’ of dominant modes of ‘sense-making’). The
lessons from the case studies suggest that in order to do this there is a need for
congurational intrapreneurs to intervene in organizational, political and cultural systems
to establish the legitimacy of alternative technological frames if any signicant change to
existing socio-technical congurations of technology and organization are to be achieved.
The case studies demonstrate some of the realities and diÝ culties of attempting to engage
in and sustain such ‘congurational activity’ over time.
In this article we have sought to further develop the understanding of change and its
unfolding complexities that the political process perspective has provided. At the same
time, we have sought to articulate better insights and perhaps guidance, from a vantage
point informed in part by our own involvement, for those seeking to intervene in change
processes in order to redirect their outcomes. As Salzman has recently noted, this task is
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one that is likely to be served best by deeper and richer case studies of change processes,
rather than more check lists of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’.49 Such research, we would argue, can
serve to increase knowledge and understanding for change agents of the ‘action space’
available to them as they seek to challenge through their own political action the
dominant beliefs, knowledge and expectations which give meaning and obduracy to
existing socio-technical congurations.
It is a salutory point in these regards to conclude by reporting the current position
(early 1999) of the three organizations. Kangaroo Whitegoods no longer manufactures
whitegoods in Australia and the plant where the sub-project took place has closed. The
situation at Wombat Plastics is unknown since access to and contact with the plant was
eÚ ectively ended at the nish of the action research project. Finally, the plant manager
who had led much of the change at Koala left the company in circumstances that
appeared to question the new corporate owner’s long term commitment to workplace
innovation. Whilst our main concern in this article has been with gaining a better
understanding of change agency, we are acutely aware that structures and context have
their part to play as well.
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